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Abstract
This paper gives an answer to the continuing emergent-deliberate debate. Thinking
and acting are two outstanding features of this controversy. What is needed in the field is a
framework that can explain under what circumstances each of these two features takes place
along the strategy-making process. The focus of the paper is on the sequence of thinking and
acting in the strategy-making process. A framework is developed to show how thinking co-
evolves with action in a succession of strategic activities. Within boundaries, strategic
activities are carried forward by social automatic behavior, following a set pattern. Yet, when
an action crosses a certain threshold, a different condition of awareness is achieved.
Similarly, thought can cross an equivalent threshold, giving rise to consciousness. Either
condition enhances the organization’s ability to make changes in the direction of its strategic
activity.SEQUENCE OF THINKING AND ACTING IN STRATEGY MAKING
Introduction
There is a running debate in the strategy-making field between the advocates of a
synoptic deliberate view of the strategic process (Ansoff, 1991) and the proponents of an
incremental emergent view of that same process (Mintzberg, 1990). The bitterness of the
controversy and the more extreme statements of their premises suggest that there is no
common ground. And the debate continues. While Ghoshal and Bartlett (2000) defend the
deliberate perspective, Weick (2000) argues for the emergent position. However far apart
these two positions may appear to be, it seems plausible to conceive of change as the
outcome of both deliberate and emergent components (Pettigrew, 2000). 
Observed change, if it contradicts previous mental schemes, motivates an inquiry
into how such change took place. Ghoshal and Bartlett (2000) investigate why certain
organizations are more successful than others in becoming flexible and responsive. They find
that successful organizations achieve the desired change because they follow a simple,
focused and purposeful sequence, phase by phase. For these authors, there is a “right”
sequence for each organization. Consequently, they claim that the feasible course for change
is determined. Once the initial level has been diagnosed, the plan can be designed to advance
phase by phase. Any other attempt that does not acknowledge the right sequence will not be
successful.
For Weick (2000) there is no right sequence; change is not a matter of replacing one
state with another, but a cumulative ongoing process. He argues that emergent and continuous
change is the foundation on which planned episodic change will either succeed or fail. To
illustrate this, he bases his argument on how inertia is conceived. If inertia is seen as an
inability to change as fast as the environment, then intervention in the form of a plan appears
necessary. This conception reflects the big picture captured by upper management. However,
if the organization is viewed from a micro level instead, what looked like repetitive action,
routine and inertia will suggest ongoing adaptation and continuous adjustment. Furthermore,
for Weick, these slight changes and adjustments tend to be a responsive form of adaptation.
Added together, these small variations can alter strategy. If there is an underlying program or
plan, there is nothing in its content that explains success or failure. It is the sense people
make of the plan that matters, that is to say, the extent to which the plan triggers sustained
animation, direction, attention/updating, and respectful interaction. 
These two positions seem distant, yet some recent contributions suggest that the
strategy-making process is neither completely deliberate nor completely emergent. For
example, Pettigrew (2000) strongly states that although the duality of emergent v. plannedhas helped to develop the field, it should now be ready for retirement. He states that the
polemic surrounding this duality prevents us from seeing the complementarities and
mutualities of the change process. In his opinion, developing complementary theory has not
been a primary concern.
One way to integrate these perspectives is through the linkage between thinking and
acting that each of them presupposes. Underlying both the synoptic and the emergent
perspective, there is an assumption regarding the sequence of thinking and acting. While for
the synoptic view thinking comes before action, for the emergent view it is action that
produces thinking. 
The two perspectives have arisen from different sources, and this partly explains
their different approaches. On the one hand, the planning perspective has developed out of a
prescriptive approach. Textbooks such as Koontz and O’Donnel (1972) have provided
principles for managers, which have been taught in business schools for the last three or four
decades. Underlying these principles, a rational order of the world is portrayed, showing how
meticulous analysis may foster orderly management. On the other hand, the emergent
perspective, led by Mintzberg, has been constructed from an empirical standpoint. Its
supporters have conducted multi-case studies, which can be traced to Mintzberg (1972),
where he first suggests an adaptive mode as opposed to planning. 
In spite of their differences, both sides seem to agree that the strategy process is a
sequence of activities. From the planning viewpoint, it is a sequence guided by the definition
of the mission, followed by internal and external scrutiny, leading to the formulation of a
strategy and concluding with implementation plans. For the emergent tradition this sequence
of activities, shaped by a “stream of decisions”, is what constitutes strategy (Mintzberg and
Waters, 1985). Such a definition of strategy excludes any element of intentionality, with the
result that a great deal of what strategy is about is actually left out. Furthermore, to make the
definition more operational, “decisions” were replaced with “actions”. This is no minor
change; the reason given for the change is that actions can be easier to trace, yet actions are
not necessarily a logical outcome of decisions. 
If the element of intention is not even considered, the connection between decisions
and actions becomes problematic (Butler et al., 1990). Actions may take place without
decisions, and decisions may not translate into actions. Moreover, decisions are made in a
particular context and can help influence the context for decision making. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a connection between actions and decisions; in
particular, there seems to be a sequence. The nature of this sequence will determine which
approach –emergent or synoptic– best fits the sequence of strategic activities. Inasmuch as
decisions lead actions, the sequence will be that thinking produces action, in line with the
planning approach. Conversely, if actions are not the result of prior decisions, thinking will
be seen as a sense-making process following from action (Weick, 1987).
The link between thinking and acting is a central point in the discussion of emergent
versus deliberate strategies. If the sequence of activities includes both action-oriented and
thought-oriented parts, then the sequence of strategic activities will be best described by a
combination of the planning and emergent descriptions. Yet, under what circumstances does
either thinking or acting dominate strategy formation? 
We propose to answer these questions by providing a framework that harmonizes the
two perspectives. First, however, we will analyze the two extremes in depth. Following that,
2we will provide a framework that describes how they interact. Finally, we will compare this
framework with other related lines of thought. 
The sequence of thinking and acting in two modes
From a synoptic rational viewpoint the direction of the sequence is that action leads
to thinking. A plan is the result of intellectual deliberation that supposedly governs activities.
Planning approaches range from the prescriptive and fixed type such as we find in Hax and
Majluf (1991) to the less restrictive, as in Friedmann (1967:225), where “... planning is
defined as the guidance of change within a social system”. Despite this range of approaches,
planning is based on forecasting, using as much information as possible to take decisions
today regarding future events. The directing role of planning is dependent upon abstraction
from day-to-day duties, and mental exercise (Andrews, 1971).
“The executives in the general office, freed from all but the most essential
entrepreneurial duties, can determine, in something of a rational manner, whether the
new product uses enough of the firm’s present resources or will help in the
development of new ones to warrant its production and sale.” (Chandler, 1962: 394) 
Once drawn up, plans are supposed to be applied to day-to-day operations. This
phase, identified by Chandler, divides the thinking activity of decision-making (formulation)
from the actual doing (implementation). According to this scheme, actions involve allocating
and reallocating resources in accordance with the plan. Since the provision of resources
depends on the plan, no initiatives take root without a plan.
The division of strategy into formulation and implementation is a methodological
construct that helps to seize the uncertainty of reality. By deliberately splitting thinking and
acting, it is a powerful reality simplifier and an important tool for developing the strategic
process. It simplifies reality by isolating the thinking activity from actions. That is why this
type of strategy process has been called rational decision-making (Rajagopalan et al., 1993). 
Although the planning approach is well established, the argument that action
precedes thinking has also been put forward. Weick (1987) develops the idea that meaning
and sense are produced through action, and that strategy acts merely as a guiding symbol. For
him, plans are one of many pretexts for generating meaning in organizations. Real strategy
lies elsewhere. Action itself is the core, since through action, meaning is created. Using the
concepts of confidence and improvisation, Weick explains various ways in which action can
take the place of strategy.
Confidence is given by a general sense of order having been imposed. Order is not
the result of extensive prior analysis, but of the manager’s effort to impose a sufficient
presumption of order. This presumption of order leads people to act more forcefully. The
more confident the presumption, the more forceful the action. At the same time,
improvisation is possible when the range of possibilities is wider, whereas having a plan can
limit the scope for experimentation or trial and error. A simple symbol, even a logo, can
provide enough sense of direction for improvisation to be possible.
The emergent approach to strategy making can be traced to Quinn (1978), who
proposes the well-known logical incrementalism. Indeed, he argues that strategic change is
rarely brought about by rational means, but rather by monitoring evolution and making
3adjustments as unforeseen events appear. His proposition certainly implies a sequence of
thinking and action, but it is also dynamic, with no beginning and no end. Moreover, he
adopts the concept of logical incrementalism because there are both cognitive and process
limits. Either or both of these limitations may prevent strategic decisions from becoming
actions. However emergent-oriented his approach, he recognizes the weight of planning,
provided it is understood as a flexible frame of reference. Thinking, seen as planning,
interacts with emergent events. 
Adopting a more radical incremental approach, Weick (1987) conceives of strategy
as an instrument to facilitate action. Any strategy will fit, so long as it makes sense of real
situations. Weick develops the idea that meaning and sense are created with respect to action,
and that, consequently, strategy acts as a guiding symbol. He claims that action is the
triggering element that is endowed with meaning through thought. 
In spite of this, thinking also triggers a redirection of strategic activities once the
change in mental maps has occured. To discover how organizational renewal works, Barr et
al. (1992) study how mental models operate in self-renewal processes. They find that
managers rely on simple mental models to give sense to the world and, more importantly, that
renewal requires a change in these mental models. Change in mental models is mostly an
incremental process, followed by an immediate change in mental maps. 
While thinking can be paralyzing if too much energy is invested in analyzing and
contemplating without actually driving strategic activities (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000), it is
also true that a pure action orientation, with no guidance, is aimless. If events are allowed to
unfold without any clear direction or sense, confusion may arise. Indeed, thinking ahead
seems a necessary condition for performance improvement, in either stable or unstable
environments (Brews and Hunt, 1999).
At this point, we can see that there are two distinct entities, as far as strategy making
is concerned. First, there are actions and thoughts, which are triggering elements. Both are
seen as having a role, inasmuch as they refocus strategic activities. And second, there is a
stream, or sequence, of strategic activities. This flow of activities can be influenced either by
thinking or by acting. However, the sequence of strategic activities is contained within a
shared framework.
Strategy as a Shared Framework of Reference
What makes the sequence of activities performed in an organization strategic is the
sense of their being intended. Pure actions or thoughts are not a guiding element. A shared
framework, however, agreed upon and developed through intentional deliberation, constitutes
a context within which strategic activities can be developed.
The idea of a shared framework provides a strong base for strategic activities to
happen. “A central idea (call it a ‘mission’ or a ‘company goal’ or ‘basic principles’),
embedded in many heads where it is evoked on the occasion of decisions, is more crucial
than an elaborate written list of things that are supposed to happen” (Simon, 1993:141).
To explain how such a shared and agreed mindset is formed, we draw on Masifern
and Vilà (1998). Strategy becomes “a shared framework in the minds of managers”. It is
achieved through a process of deliberation in which mutually contrasting ideas give birth to
4an agreed upon approach. One way to do this is first to define an “ideal” strategy, with no
restrictions, as the best conceivable response to external impacts. Once this objective function
has been defined, restrictions can be added to arrive at a “possible strategy”. “Purposively a
gap is created, by envisioning an ideal strategy that gradually settles down to a feasible
strategy. The result is a framework of reference that constitutes the shell by which managers
decide in real time with coherence” (Masifern and Vilà, 1998:23). This process of
deliberation and agreement to guide daily activity is not just any mental framework, but the
result of formal decisions, agreement and deliberation.
The shared framework starts from a thinking activity, not from a blank sheet of
paper. It is in this primary thinking activity that the ideal future is articulated. The concept of
dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) is different to the
shared framework. While the dominant logic is built on shared experience and learning, the
shared framework in the minds of managers builds on skills of reflection. This distinction is
what provides creativity and imagination.
Updating or refocusing the shared framework is feasible at any moment, yet more
important is the sense of stability it provides. In fact, actions or thoughts can redirect strategic
activities, but within the shared frame of reference. The frame of reference operates like a
shell for managers to decide on a day-to-day basis. Sparking actions or thoughts may be
compared with this framework to guide strategic activities. Yet, the shared framework is not a
trap. As new events unfold it can be reshaped by reaching new agreements through
deliberation.
Our approach is different from that of Pfeffer and Sutton (2000). While they study
the reasons why thinking is not translated into action, we look at how thinking and acting can
become windows of awareness or consciousness. Neither thinking nor acting are ends in
themselves; they can cast light on the sequence of activities that make up the strategy-making
process. They are instruments that can bring about changes in the flow of strategic activities,
or even in the shared framework.
From the existing literature we have obtained three elements. First, we have
identified strategy as a framework of reference that circumscribes strategic activities. Second,
the flow of strategic activities themselves. Third, we have categorized actions and thoughts as
factors that trigger attention. Substantial actions or thoughts may foster further refocusing of
the sequence of strategic activities. 
Four levels of analysis, at least, can correlate these components: sequence (Lovas
and Ghoshal, 2000); learning (Argyris, 1977); influence on performance; and satisfaction of
achievement or dissatisfaction of failure (Hart and Banbury, 1994). I will briefly touch on
some aspects of the latter three issues, but I will concentrate on the first one, sequence.
Thinking and acting as a sequence of co-evolving entities
We have seen how, according to the planning approach, thinking precedes action,
whereas from an emergent perspective action precedes thinking. However, these two facets
have something in common: neither is habitual nor commonly occurring. Each provides
enlightenment, direction, and steering. Each provides reasons for adjustments or changes in
the sequence of strategic activities. And each can be a powerful organizational alignment
mechanism. Thus, thinking and acting can be parallel tools for strategic management.
5Although, by construction, a plan should cover all relevant issues, it will not include any that
were unknown or unseen at the time the plan was made. Of course, new or unexpected
situations can be examined as they arise, and their implications can be incorporated in the
plan. Yet, the fact of such rectification suggests that the plan itself is something dynamic. The
plan will never be finished; it will be continually updated with each new discovery. 
Action, as used in this framework, will be a significant moment within a movement.
An action will mean one type of discovery. Discovery will inevitably include failure, such as
mistakes, dead ends, interference, and feedback loops, since these are part of the process of
finding valuable resources. Although apparently the plan could have prevented failure, it was
never possible. Indeed, new discoveries were unknowns when the plan was devised. 
These apparently contradictory views are in fact complementary. Either the sense
provided by actions or the sprouting of new ideas will be embodied in the flow of strategic
activities. Bearing this complementary characteristic in mind, we will attempt to provide a
harmonizing framework.
If the strategy-making process is a sequence of activities, these activities could be
characterized by two extremes: either primarily dominated by thinking, or mainly driven by
acting. Consequently, we can imagine a continuum in between. Strategic activities may lie at
any point along this continuum, from being conducted by a higher proportion of thought to
being guided mainly by action. What is missing in the field, however, is a scheme that can
explain under what circumstances each extreme takes place at an organizational level. 
We will adopt the approach of the collective mind, which allows the unit of analysis
to be the organizational level. Within this approach, strategic activities are carried out on a
regular basis by social automatic behavior (Spender, 1998). For Spender the flow of normal
activities develops in what he calls an objectified process, where knowledge is embedded in
the sequence of activities and requires the support of a social group delimited in space and
mind.
Spender proposes the concept of the “activity system” to link the individual and
collective mind. It is through activities that the constitution and reconstitution of society
evolves.  Moreover, this suggests a distinction between social and abstract knowledge. While
the latter can be stored in libraries, the former is embedded in practice and contextualized in a
particular field of activity. “In activity systems knowledge cannot be separated from the
activity, its quality is only evident in the activity” (Spender, 1998:22).
The strategy-making process can be described as an activity system. While in a
stable state, the sequence of activities follows a pattern, its components being a blend of
thought and action. Occasionally, sparks of awareness produced by actions or sparks of
consciousness produced by thinking will reroute the sequence. This scheme is shown in
Figure 1.
6Figure 1. Thinking co-evolving with acting
This scheme seeks to harmonize the abovementioned contradictory views in a
comprehensive conceptual framework. The winding arrow stands for the flow of one
strategic activity, characterized by a co-evolution of thought and action. Strategic activities
comprise both thinking and action orientation in different proportions. These activities are
carried out within a shared and agreed framework, represented by the large arrow.
Meanwhile, the twofold boundary stands for the thresholds of awareness and consciousness.
If the sequence of strategic activities lies within the flow of automatic concatenation,
then the strategy-making process includes thinking and acting in an objectified or social
autonomous process. The more important thing, however, is the mechanics that make it
possible to achieve the conditions of awareness or consciousness. 
Within this shared framework, thinking and acting operate as attention-sparking
features. Social autonomous behavior characterizes the sequence of strategic activities. The
sequence remains consistent with the shared framework in the minds of the actors.
The sequence of the strategic activity is altered when either outstanding acting or outstanding
thinking flashes attention, calling for redirection to achieve the desired strategy. 
The new insights can be of two different kinds. On the one hand, strategic activities
can be affected by a planning effort. Thorough planning, forecasting and analysis can be
leading elements of deliberation to guide subsequent strategy implementation. This is the
type of consciousness produced by thinking. On the other hand, emergent action generates
episodes which, once assumed, can be leading components of a new redirection. The
resulting rationalization is an ex-post sense-giving device. This is the type of awareness
produced by action 
Thoughts that spark consciousness are to be pursued intentionally. So, possible
courses of strategic activities can be pointed at.  Opportunities that give rise to consciousness
through thinking must lead to an outpouring of new ideas, making it possible for the






action awarenessWhat makes thinking or acting crucial is the extent to which new information fits
with existing mental schemes. Each, in a different way, poses new challenges, but both open
the way to an enhancement of mental models.
In line with Masifern and Vilà (1998), mental models can be updated inasmuch as
they redirect strategic activities towards the desired future. However, “the most crucial part of
developing learning as one of the successful outputs of strategy making is that of eliciting
managers’ ‘taken-for-granted’ mental models in their world” (van der Heijden and Eden,
1998:66). For learning to occur, a certain awakening device must be present, otherwise the
mental model will remain unchanged.  The mental model, then, is supposed to be flexible
enough to give room for change, but at the same time rooted firmly enough to confer
direction. 
These two characteristics, though seemingly opposed, are compatible within the
framework presented here. The two mechanisms we propose for updating mental models are
thinking and acting insofar as they generate consciousness and awareness. Deliberate and
frequent exercises of this kind will prevent the mental models from becoming traps and make
it possible to deal with uncertainty explicitly. The exercise of deliberately eliciting new ideas
and comparing them with the strategies currently in use makes it possible to inspect those
strategies and either redirect them or carry on in the same direction. Similarly, using action
deliberately as an awareness-creating mechanism, by testing new opportunities, can also
foster change. Use of these two mechanisms to test the validity of the existing strategy leaves
organizations better prepared to deal with the unexpected. Yet, it remains to be explored what
causes these outstanding events –whether thoughts or actions– to occur.
The exercise of provoking awareness or consciousness is certainly deliberate. We
argue that an intentional effort to trigger awareness will be the differentiating element for
better preparation and skill development, in spite of the environment. This deduction is
supported by Brews and Hunt (1999), for whom purposeful planning is positively related to
performance in both stable and unstable environments and to the intentional flexibility to
adjust a constituent part of the strategic activity. Indeed, what is outstanding is that the will to
provoke enlightenment is deliberate.  It seems that neither acting nor thinking should occur
on a random basis; on the contrary, they are supposed to be pursued with premeditation.
The force that propels strategy, as seen from an ex-ante viewpoint, cannot be merely
a sequence that will evolve through thinking and acting events. The intention to guide the
sequence of strategic activities is a third party in this dyadic sequence. Butler et al. (1990:15)
stress that “…by definition strategy must surely involve a degree of intention to act, a kind of
plan which is to be put into effect”. However, intention is revealed in two forms in the
framework presented here: in the form of stability, represented by the shared framework in
the minds of managers, which is aimed at the central idea (mission, company goal or basic
principles); and in the form of flexibility, represented by the corrections built into the shared
framework.
Without stability, the sequence of strategic activities can flow in any pattern; by
itself the existence of a sequence does not indicate the existence of a strategy (Inkpen and
Choudhury, 1995). Absence of strategy is perfectly possible if the sequence of strategic
activities reveals no consistent interconnectedness. On the other hand, stability should not
preclude the flexibility to adapt to the unknown. There can also be an absence of strategy if
stability prevents adaptation.
8In summary, we have identified thinking and acting as two outstanding ways to
create consciousness and awareness. Both are an integral part of the strategy process at an
organizational level. This process has been identified as the sequence of activities, partly
thinking and partly acting, that are carried out through social autonomous behavior. 
This behavior is framed by a shared understanding in the minds of managers. Either
thinking or acting may interrupt the autonomous behavior. Then, if necessary, the sequence is
refocused. Furthermore, even the shared framework can be revised, subject to formal and
collective deliberation, to build a new agreement.
The artificial separation of emergent and deliberate processes of strategy making
does not contribute to the analysis and development of theory in this field. In contrast, a more
realistic perspective is gained by integrating views. The main harmonizing element presented
here is that thinking and acting are means to discover reality.
Lastly, we have identified the driver that provokes attention-triggering action or
thought as the deliberate intention to make such action or thought happen. As the shared
framework provides stability and is embedded in the minds of managers, it also fosters
creativity and imagination through purposeful thinking or acting. Strategy is both continuity
and adaptability. In the following section we will reinterpret some extant streams of research
in light of the scheme we have proposed. By doing so we can shed light on our framework. 
Examination of some extant lines of thought in light of the thinking-acting scheme
The idea that both thinking and acting can contribute to the development of the
sequence of strategic activities is an attempt to move towards a more comprehensive
understanding of the strategy-making process. The lines of thought we have chosen are not
only compatible with our scheme; they are also attempts to overcome the emergent-deliberate
dichotomy. Besides, by examining them we can enrich our framework.
The first piece we will analyze is Chakravarthy (1982). His main argument is that
adaptation is enhanced by a condition of balance between organizational resources and
environmental circumstances. Indeed, strategic management is the process of continuously
adapting to changes in a firm’s environment (Schendel and Hofer, 1979). This dynamic
perception of strategic management certainly fits with our framework, since strategy is not
the answer to one unchanging problem; it is consistently answering whatever questions turn
up.
For Chakravarthy (1982) the ability to adapt is related to structure. The more loosely
coupled the components of the organization, the better the chances of deliberation and
discussion. Although we do not consider a specific structure in our framework, we do include
deliberation, discussion, and agreement while building and reshaping the shared framework
in the minds of managers. The capacity to pursue thinking or acting conditions of
consciousness and  awareness  will be attained when deliberation is fostered within the
organization.
In our proposed framework agreement is achieved through deliberation on what
strategy to follow; then, each manager, from his position, will act accordingly. However, if
new events occur, whether prompted by thought or action, and a need for redirection is
perceived, then through deliberation and reflection the strategy can be modified.
9Chakravarthy proposes a twofold output of the adaptation process. The first output is
adaptive specialization, which involves formulating a strategy. And the second output is
adaptive generalization, which involves developing new strategies to face greater
environmental complexity. While the former is similar to our description of a sequence of
activities flowing in automatic behavior, the latter stands for our description of the capacity to
purposefully articulate sparks of awareness or consciousness.
However, Chakravarthy’s description accounts for the dynamics of adaptive
specialization at the expense of adaptive generalization. While he claims that the former is a
necessary condition for the latter, in our framework the two processes can coexist. The
sequence of strategic activities is maintained, as agreement is maintained with the shared
framework in the minds of mangers. Yet, the change necessary to outperform competitors is
only achieved through adaptive generalization. The sparks of awareness or consciousness
produced by purposeful acting or thinking allow for new possible courses. Our framework
adds another tool in this line. Through these mechanisms, even though uncertainty is not
eliminated, it is made explicit, allowing new events to become opportunities.
Adaptive generalization as defined by Chakravarthy (1982) can also be seen as the
capacity of a firm to renew itself. The concept of self-renewal proposed by Huff et al. (1992)
and Barr et al. (1992) brings out beautifully the dynamic nature of strategy. Barr et al. (1992)
conclude that renewal hinges not so much on noticing new conditions, but on being able to
link environmental change to corporate strategy and modify the linkage over time. Moreover,
for Barr et al. (1992) mental maps are what direct strategic activities; without change in
mental maps renewal is never achieved. This approach fits with our scheme, yet it
emphasizes the point that it is not just awareness or consciousness by themselves that redirect
strategic activities. It is the consequent change in the shared framework that causes
redirection. 
Huff et al. (1992) describe renewal as the outcome of the interaction between
cumulative stress and inertia. They define both terms as summarizing concepts. Inertia is
defined as the commitment to the current strategy and anything that supports the current way
of doing things. Stress, on the other hand, is defined as the dissatisfaction with the current
strategy and imperfections in the fit between the organization and its environment. 
These two opposing forces will account for the occurrence of self-renewal. Inertia
tends to increase over time. When a strategy is first put into place, it means a certain level of
commitment; then, as routines and procedures are developed, the process of
institutionalization causes commitment to grow. Huff et al. (1992) use the term “cumulative
inertia” to refer to this sequence of escalating commitment. Stress, too, may be cumulative.
Since no strategy can perfectly foresee all eventualities, stress is generated as unexpected
events unfold. Inconsistencies with experience become apparent, and this process is
accelerated by the dynamism of the environment. 
The tendency of a system to maintain stability will be guided by inertia. And stress,
even though it is accumulated over time, will be more associated with specific events that
directly capture attention. The stability mode of the system suits our framework, inasmuch as
it parallels to the social autonomous sequence of strategic activities. Nevertheless, stress, as it
is reflected in specific events, describes the backbone of how actions or thoughts may spark
awareness or consciousness. These two conditions make the system able to renew itself and
feedback strategic activities.
10Huff et al. (1992) suggest that stress and inertia are independent and should be
analyzed simultaneously. Similarly, in our framework the attention-triggering events that
refocus the sequence of strategic activities are treated separately; while strategic activities
stand as the normal flow, the attention-triggering events appear as occasional. For this reason
unexpected events cannot be ignored. On the contrary, it is their recognition that provides the
opportunity. Whether it is through action or thinking, once recognized and reflected they can
become opportunities for renewal.
Conclusion
The conditions of consciousness or awareness are supposed to be guided. Whether
the triggering element is thinking or acting, the will to pursue the awareness is deliberate.
Simply letting the autonomous process of strategic activities unfold is not enough if strategic
management is to be guided.  The role of managers in this framework is to guide the
sequence and generate the two types of triggering elements. As in Lovas and Ghoshal (2000),
the strategy-making process is guided. The occasional awareness or consciousness conditions
should not be left to occur at random, they should be deliberately made to occur. 
Furthermore, the will to pursue the conditions of awareness and consciousness is
directed towards changing mental models. If new ideas or insight are not incorporated into
managers’ mental models, then no change will take place (Senge, 1992). One reason for
reviewing or changing the existing mental models is the degree of dissatisfaction with the
current strategy.
With respect to the development of the strategy field, Mintzberg and Lampel (1999)
point out that strategy has been obsessed, first, with planning, then position, and now
learning, instead of looking at the whole animal. They suggest an effort to go beyond the
fragmented analysis from one point of view. Though the task of accurately combining
different approaches is difficult and may result in incoherence (Van de Ven, 1992), the
attempt must be made. 
The focus of this paper has been the sequence of thinking and action in the strategy-
making process. This sequence is not unidirectional; on the contrary, thinking co-evolves
with action in a succession of strategic activities.
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